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Operations 2d Armored Division for period April 22 to July 25th

#### HISTOR ICAL RECORD - OPERATIONS OF U.S. SECOND ARMORED DIVISION (KOOL FORCE)

SECTION I - Concentration and training for HUSKY SECTION II - Loading for HUSKY Operation. SECTION III - Operations on SICILY.

#### SECTION I

#### Concentration and Training for Husky

1. Concentration - April 22 to May 22. Pursuant to orders CG, IAC (see Incl 1), 2d AD moved from RABAT, FRENCH MOROCCO to vicinity of FAITC (PORT AUX POULES), ALGERIA by rail and motor beginning April 22 and closing May 22. An average train density of 2 500-ton trains daily was allotted to the division for the move. Track vehicles, except lightly loaded H/T, moved by rail from PORT LYAUTEY and all other vehicles moved overland. Car crews and necessary command groups moved with their respective commands by rail or road. This movement was made without incident except that shortage of rail equipment, interruption of rail service for two days by flash flood near MEKNES, MOROCCO, and heavy traffic both rail and road delayed the concentration.

#### 2. Training -

a. During the period May 16 to June 19, intensive physical hardening training was conducted which included violent exercises, calisthenics, obstacle courses, rope climbing, forced road marches, etc. All guns were test fired and tactical exercises using ball ammunition were conducted. Amphibious training utilizing the facilities of the FAITC, included instruction and practical work in waterproofing vehicles, loading various types of craft and ships, and landing exercises.

b. Difficulty was experienced with unloading LST's and LCT's since the draft of these vessels was not suited to the gradient of the beaches in the vicinity of ARZEW. Considerable lost time resulted while various unloading expedients for unloading LST's were tried out under the direction of the Navy an. FAITC. The final solution of unloading LST's was to use LCT's with sides out out and transhipping the vehicles, an unsatisfactory solution at the best, slow and laborious in a calm see and a most difficult task in the dark or with a sea running. Little attention was paid to this practice loading by Naval officers except by very junior officers, and no comments were made concerning weight limitations of LST's.

c. A practice landing was conducted June 17th - 19th which was intended to be a full scale rehearsal. Elaborate preparations were made along the selected beach, such as wire, obstacles, enemy in position with flares, annumition, etc. Secrecy as to hour and place of landing was maintained until the convoy put out to sea. Due to lack of shipping, only approximately 50% of the assault units and about 75% of the armored vehicles could participate. This excluded troops and vehicles loaded on the two troop ships, the seven Liberty type store ships, twelve ICI's and five ICT's. This exercise had considerable Waining benefit to those who participated but due to the relatively small scale of the operation it was of limited value to the division as a whole.

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# SECTION IT + Loading for HUSKY Operation

June 13 to July 5 - Concurrently with the above training equip-3. a... ment was propered for shipment, vehicles were waterproofed, and ships and craft loaded in accordance with mounting schedule prescribed by CG 7th Army.

Inspection of ships and craft indicated generally insufficient b. anti-aircraft protection. To overcome this, organic weapons of this division were loaded on decks in favorable locations to completely cover respective ships. These juns were included in the anti-aircraft protection of the ship and were fired under the supervision of and at the direction of, Naval gunnery officers on board.

1. Secrecy -

All loading of personnel, except for small details, was accomp-8. liched at night. Mecessary moss personnel, ships guard, billeting parties, advance CP's, etc., were brought to ships side in small groups so as not to attract attention to loading being conducted.

The vacated bivourc sites were taken over by personnel remaining b. behind and in construction of duray tents and other installations, so as to present a picture of an unchanged bivouac. This rearrangement of camp was accomplished under cover of dariness and concurrently with the departure of broops being loaded.

A signal detachment with comparable number of raches to these C. of the 2d Armored Division was installed prior to the loading dates and took over all radio traffic of the division so as to present unchanged radio activity.

All plans and orders in connection with this operation and loadd. ing very hept in a locked room under guard to which only officers classified for the purpose had access. Orders necessary to accomplish the loading and essential advance planning were issued to subordinates without explanation or discussion of the operation.

5. Sea Trip -

Due to convoy requirements the landing craft types of vessels: 8. 23 - LCI transporting 18th RCT

armored elements of CC. "D" and advance 11 5 - LST'S elements of the 540th Engineers

7 - LON's transporting 540th Engineers, armored vohicles cc "B",

left AREA, June 21th to rendezvous of TURIS-DIZ RTE area June 27th. They departed, from the MIZERTS area July 8th.

LST's assigned to amored units had been loaded exactly as they here loaded in the prectace energiese June 17, varying in pay lead from about 600 tons to about 650 tons. On July 3rd, nine days after the departure of these craft fremAH 151 and five days before their sailing date, orders were rec ived from the Eavy to reduce the weights to 500 tons each. This would have reduced the tank strength of "KCOL" to about one company of medium tanks.

This separation from the rest of the division necessitated the bransmission of any last nimute instructions to then by courier. Three such trips were required due to changes in the situation. He contact other than this courier service was established with these craft until arrival of the convey off CHLA, SICILY on D - Day when radio contact was established.

5. Sea Trip - (Cont'd)

b. Seven (7) Liberty ships carried a considerable portion of the combat and administrative vehicles of the "KOOL" Force in addition to essential ammunition, gasoline, and rations for the operation. These ships departed from ORAN on July 5th with the troops ships but due to convoy requirements left that convoy. They rejoined KOOL Force off GELA, D plus 1 day.

c. Two (2) troops ships transporting "KOOL" Hq, CC "B" Hq and crew for combat vehicles (being carried in Liberty ships and landing craft) departed ORAN on July 5th and arrived off GELA with assault force on D-Day.

6. Debarkation - Constant and close liaison was maintained with the Navy during the preparation of plans and orders. Orders as issued were in every respect in accord with Naval operational orders. On arrival off SICILY however several instances occurred which materially delayed the landing.

Small craft were not manned by sufficiently trained or responsible a.. personnel. Numerous examples were noted where boats failed to come alongside in response to orders, land as directed or return to the proper ship for reloading. In many instances Army Commandors ashore searched up and down the beach for these craft and redirected them on their mission. It appeared that the small craft were used entirely at the will of the operators, there being no sentrel conterol of these vessels.

It is believed essential that these craft be operated in small groups each under the control of a responsible Naval officer. Adequate communication between boat group commanders and individual LCM's, LCVP's and LCT's, must be provided. This control must tie the beachmaster to the boat group commander as well as the controlling Naval authority afloat. Orders given in many cases by the beachmaster were not obeyed by small boats.

b. On receipt of orders to land, information was received from the Naval command that ICI's were at that time in cruising formation and not the planned landing formation. It being impracticable to weigh anchor, maneuver out to sea, and assume the proper formation, it was decided to debark the 18th CT from the cruising formation of the ships and reorganize troops into attack formation on shore.

c. The plan for debarkation of troops and vehicles contemplated the transfer of car crews from troops ships to the store ships at sea, so as to permit landing vehicles with their operating crews. The store ships arriving in the transport area the day after the troops ships carrying car crews made this plan impractical and the troops were landed separately. This complicated the assembly of the command a shore ..

d. Landing operations were difficult due to the high surf that was running and the almost continuous enemy action by long range artillery fire, aorial bombardment and strafing.





SECTION III - Operations

7. "KOOL" Force, under the command of Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, Jonstituted the Seventh Army Floating Reserve. This force was grouped into the following major units to facilitate landing either opposed or behind a secured beachhead. A complete troop list is attached marked "Incl #2".

> ASSAULT -18th Inf 32nd FA Co "g", 1st Engrs. Bn. Co "B", 1st Med. Bn. Det. 540th Engrs. 2 Plats. Co. "I", 67th AR CC "B" 3rd Bn., 67th AR (-) Co. "A", 41st Arm'd Inf (Mtd in H/T) 78th FA Co "C", 82nd Ren. Bn. Co "B", 17th Engrs RESERVE 82nd Ron. En. (less 3 Ron Co's) lst Bn., 41st Inf (less Co. "A") (dismtd) BEACH GROUP 540th Engrs. (less one En.) (reinf) 107th AA Bn. (-) 433rd AA Bn. (-) SERVICE Det. 48th Med. In. Det. 2d Arm'd Div. Maint. Bn. Let. 2d Arm'd Div. Supply Bn. 396th QM Port Bn.

8. Missions .- The general mission assigned "KOOL" force was to "Sail with assault convoy, prepared to land in support of any of the Assault Forces". In order to accomplish this, two general plans were propared which were to be placed in operation en orders CG "KOOK".

Plan "A" - Land on one or two beaches at which beachheads had already been established, and assemble the command prepared to operate in support of other assault forces as ordered by CG Seventh Army.

Plan "B" - Force a landing on one or more designated beaches and operate in support of other assault forces as ordered.

9. Operations -

July 10 - The troops ships and landing craft of KOOL Force arrived off GELA, SICILY in rendezvous area about 0200B July 10. About 1330 CG Kool went aboard the flag ship CG Seventh Army to determine the situation ashore and the expected hour for landing.

At 1340B orders wore received to gebark KOOL Force. This order included a directive that the Naval Cmdr would designate suitable beaches in the GELA area. Certain 1st Div beaches were indicated as satisfactory. Upon receipt of this information command reconnaissance parties were immediately sent ashore to make arrangments for assembly areas, routes from beach and necessary guides. Later information was received from the Navy that the beaches given as satisfactory were suitable only for certain type of craft and that the bulk of the force would land at different beaches. This change was transmitted by radio to the Chief of Staff KOOL, ashore, who made the necessary readjustments. Debarkation was delayed some two hours by this enforced change. 164

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In the meantime landing craft from LST's (no landing craft could be carried on vessels of "KOOL" Force except LST's, due to their design and weight limitations) were assembled and dispatched to pick up battalion commanders from their respective ship and bring them to the KOOL flag ships for issuance of debarkation orders.

Debarkation of the 18th CT and 1st Bn 41st Inf was initiated at 1800B and completed prior to daylight. Both units except for a few scattered detachments which had been landed at the wrong becches were closed in assembly areas north of Hwy 115 and east of GELA by daylight.

July 11 - Debarkation of CC "B" jersonnel was completed before dark.

Two platoons of Co "I", 67th AR tare debarked about 0200B July 11. Because of the high surf and congestion on the boach, it was decided not to unload additional armored vehicles during the hears of darkness. The balance of CC "B" vohicles were started ashore about 11:0B, By dark all tanks 3rd En., 67th AR, 8 tanks of 82nd Ren and the bulk of the 78th FA En. vohicles were ashore.

About 1000B the 1st Inf Div was counter-attacked by elements of the HERMANN GOERING PANZER REGT consisting of 30 to 40 tanks (Mark VI, Mark IV and Mark IV Specials). These tanks broke through the 1st Div. position and debouched on the plain northeast of GELA. One platoon of Co "I", 67th AR, some field artillery and infantry cannon of 1st Inf Div engaged them and successfully repulsed the attack destroying 14 enemy tanks. The action lasted until about noon. During the course of the engagement several tanks were unloaded and moved rapidly to the dunes north of the boach to engage the enemy in case of further penetration. Also, the dismounted elements of Co "D", 82nd Ren were placed in position on the ridge north of the beach to prevent infiltration. These elements did not participate in this engagement but were in position to meet the enemy had he continued his advance.

At 1100B lst Bn,, 41st Inf (-Co  $\Lambda$ ), was attached to the lst Div and marched to join the Rangers at GELA.

About noon, Co "G", 67th AR was attached to the 1st Div to support the 16th CT.

About the same time, Co. "H", 67th AR was also attached to 1st Div and the Co. (less one platoon), moved west of GELA in support of the 16th CT. One platoon Co. "H", 67th AR was held in the vicinity of GELA in support of the Rangers.

Two platoons Co. "E", 67th AR, attached to 1st Div. in Africa, were disposed as follows: 1st platoon joined Co. "H", 67th AR, and was attached in support of 16th CT. 2d platoon reverted to 2d Arm'd Div and assigned to CC "B"

During the afternoon almost continuous bombing and strafing attacks were directed at shipping lying off GELA. Several ships and craft were damaged by near misses. One Liberty Ship (ROBERT ROWAN) assigned this division received a direct hit and burned. The cargo and vehicle load were a complete loss except for a few DUKWS that had been unloaded prior to the attack.

In late afternoon orders were received to protect the 1st Div right and rear, and that the 2d Bn, 18th Inf reverted to the 1st Div. KOOL Force was disposed during the night July 11-12 in compliance with this order as shown on skotch #2. marked Incl #4.

July 12 - At 0900B 3 enemy tanks of the 4th Co, 1st Bn HERMANN GOERING REGT attacked the SE flank of the 1st Div. Two of the three tanks were destroyed by guns of the 32nd FA Bn and Plat 67th AR. The third withdrew. During the day several tank attacks were repulsed in this sector.

In the sector of the 16th CT, Co G, 67th AR took part in several tank vs tank actions destroying six enomy tanks and three other vehicles with probably hits on five others.

In the sector of the 26th CT Co. "H", 67th AR supported the advance of the 26th Enf. Elective use was made of the tanks as artillery support and in brase ing up tank attacks. Six enemy tanks (incl. 2 Mark VI) were knocked out by the company in addition to the effective fire support against enemy strong points.

Combat Command "B" displaced forward after dark to the vicinity of Hwy 115 and the NISCHNI MCAD. The remaining tanks of Co. "D", 82nd Ren Bn wore unloaded making total tank strength at this time of 22 medium tanks and 21 light tanks directly under CG MOOL, and 42 medium tanks attached to the 1st Div. Facilities of the beach group of KOOL were pooled with those of the 1st Inf Div and beaches and supply DP's were operated jointly.

July 13 - Pursuant to orders CG Seventh Army the use of the code name KOOL Force for 2d Arm'd Div was discontinued. During the morning the 18th CT was released from the 2d AD and reverted to the 1st Inf. Div. The 1st and 1th Ranger Dns., 33rd Cml Dn were released from attachment to 1st Div. and attached to 2d AD. The 1st En, 11st Inf was released from attachment to 1st Div and reverted to 2d AD. At this time, the Rangers and 1st Dn. 11st Inf were occupying and protesting GELA and occupying positions covering the plains north and west of GLA on the heights in vicinity of HONTE SAN HECOLA and HT. LUNGO.

About noon, CG 2d AD ordered the Rengers, 83rd Cal. Bn, hist Inf, 82nd Ren Da. (1988 det), and 76th FA to advance north under the cover of darkness and at 22309 to avtage: and secure HUT MA and the heights dominating that tom.

Information was received shortly after noon that a force of hositle troops had entered MUMAA. Immediately the town was taken under fire by neval gun fire. Later during the afternoon white flags were observed displayed from some of the buildings in town.

The advance moved out as acheduled and on the outskirts of BUT RA considerable resistance was met.

CC "B" in the meantime continued on its mission of protection of the right flank of the 1st Div and extensive patrolling in the gap between the 45th Div and the 1st Div. (See shiften Ho. 3, marked Incl #5).

Tank units attached to the 1st Div continued in support of assigned combat teams.

July 14 - The resistance in front of BUTERA was overcome by skillful memouver by one company of Rangers and at 0300B in the morning of 14 July the leading allowants entered the town of BUTERA. A number of Italian prisoners were taken, from 28th FA Dn, 1st Dn 33rd Inf and 1st Bn, 54 Inf all of 4 (LIVOLIO) Division.

Combat Command "B" continued to protect the east flank of the let Inf. Div. Meconvicuance patrols were maintained east beyond the ACATI NIV'R and northeast for a distance of several miles along the two reads running parellel to and yest of the river.

During the morning of 14 July, Commanding General 2d Arm'd Div received orders from CG Seventh Army that all tanks attached to the 1st Inf. Div. reverted to the 2d Arm'd Div. Combat Command "B", started assembling tanks in assembly area between DLU: DACH and Highway 115 easy of GELA.

During the afternoon of 14 July, pursuant to orders CG Seventh Army, Co "I", 67th AR with one plat. Co "A", 41st Inf. attached, moved to the northeast to block the highway northeast of GELA between the 15th Div and lot Inf Div. In the meantime the remainder of the Division continued occupation of HUT TRA and organization of hills which dominated the total. (See sketch #4, and 5, marked Inc. #6 and T).

July 15 - On 15 July disposition of this division remained unchanged. 83rd Cal Bn Was detached from the 2d Arm'd Div. Send Ren Bn conducted petrolling of the area north of BUTERA between the 3rd Inf. Div and the 26th Regt. C T of the 1st Inf. Div. Contact was gained and maintained with both of these units.

July 16 - On July 16, pursuant to orders of the CG Seventh Army, elements of the Zd Arm'd Div were relieved from patrols and outposts and assembled for maintenance and rehabilitation in preparation of assembly of entire division in CAMPOBELLO area. The beach group and 10° AAA and 183rd AAA were relieved from attachment to the division, During the morning of 16 July, the lot phf. Div. reported that the 26th CT was being attached by (orman medium tenks and that they required help. CG 2d Arm'd Div alerted tanks of 82nd Ren Bn and the 78th FA and led them to BARRAFRANCA to repel the attack. Upon reaching MAZZARINO it was learned that the tank attack had been repelled with the means at hand. The 2d Armored Division units then returned to former areas in the vicinity of BUTERA,

July 17'- 18 - The division assembled in CAMPOBELLO area closing at 1330B July 18. All detachments then present in SICILY reverted. The division was now organized as follows:

> Hq. 2d AD 82nd Ron. En. (lass one Ren Co.) 41st Armid Inf. Regt. 66th AR 3rd Bn. 67th AR #2 Plats, Co "E" attached) 1st and 4th Ranger Bnis. 17th Engr. Bn. (less 2 Cois and Hq. Det) 14th FA 78th FA Cois B and C, 48th Med. Bn. 106th CA AA (SP) Det. Maint. and Sup. Bn. Det. 51st Med. and 36th Amb. Bn. (See Incl. #8 for complete troop listing).

The objective of the Seventh Army was announced as PALERMO and the 2d AD as the army reserve. The 2d AD was given the mission of being prepared to exploit the successes of assault units or to extend the envelopment through CASTELVETKANO. The 82nd Ren Bn was detached from the division and given the mission to cover the front of the Provisional Corps. The displacement of the division westward was initiated during the night 18-19 July.

July 19 - 20 - Movement to the west continued by bounds. The division completed displacement from CAMPOBELLO to AGRIGENTO where it was held pending orders CG Seventh Army. Orders were received about noon assigning 2d AD to the Provisional Corps. During the afternoon July 20 and night July 20-21, division moved from AGRIGENTO to march assembly areas in the vicinity of RIBERA.

The 1st and 4th Ranger Bn were relieved from attachment to the division and orders received to transport this force to the LD for their attack against CASTELVERNANO. The 62d FA (A) Bn and 20th Engr. Bn. were attached to the 2d AD.

July 21st - During morning of July 21, the leading elements of the division had reached the Belice River where they were held pending the capture of CASTRIVETRANO. The mission of taking this city was assigned to Task Force X under CG prov Corps. Task Force X consisted of the 39th CT, 77th FA, 1st Ranger Bn, and 4th Ranger Bn. The city was captured during the afternoon and the force continued the attack in the direction of MARSAIA. This action secured our left flank and rear and covered our turn to the north against PALERMO. During the evening orders were received to assemble NE of CASTEL-VETRANO and attack at 220000B, CG 2d AD ordered advance, CC "A" in the lead, CC "B" following by bounds to phase lines prepared to extend envelopment.

The entire movement from AGRIGANTO to assembly areas west of BELICE RIVER was made along one road in the face of most difficult conditions. All important bridges had been blown out necessitating bypasses through precipitous gorges or in some cases through railway tunnels. Engineers worked unceasingly on these by-passes improving them, widening the trails, clearing mines, both on the roads and on adjaining shoulders and fields. In addition, the movement was made across the rear of the 3rd **Div.** through the rear elements of the 82nd AB Div and in the latter stages on the same road with the two Ranger Battalions and 39th CT shuttling forward into assembly position for attack on CASTELVETRANO. The division, short as it was on transportation, furnished MT for the move of the two Ranger Battalions.

July 22d = At 0600B the leading elements of the division moved out to the attack along the axis shown in sketch #6, Incl. #9. Each defile was strongly defended by A-T weapons and machine guns cleverly emplaced and protected by infantry. Each of these elements had to be reduced one by one. Not until surrounded by infantry and shelled by artillery and/or tanks was there any sign of surrender. For the most part, the A-T guns were manned by Germans, and the infantry protection furnished by Italians. These actions were principally advance guard handled by the leading elements of the division and reconnaissance companies of the 82nd Ren.

Leading elements of the division on arrival at the pass 4 miles NE of SAN GUISSEPPE were held up by a determined defense in depth by A-T guns including German 88mm s. These guns were well emplaced in the sides of the canyons, cleverly concealed and in an extremely strong natural position. This resistance was overcome by flanking action of dismounted patrols covered by artillery, tank and supporting cannon gun fire. In the meantime, reconnaissance was being pushed around the flanks, to determine routes to by-pass the defile.

The division remained on the corps phase line until 2000B when it was ordered to enter PAIRMO. Guards were placed on docks, banks, and other important building and utilities to prevent their destruction, active patrolling was conducted during the night.

On arrival at CAMPOREALE CC "B" was directed to extend the envelopment to the NW with the mission to clean out resistance in that area and to be prepared to assist CC "A" in 'capture of PALERMO. CC "B" at that time consisted of:

> lstign. 4lst Inf. co "C", 66th AR 3rd Bn. 67th AR (2 Plats co "E" attchd) 78th FA Co. "B", 17th Engrs. (one plat 20th Engrs attchd)

July 23rd - Resistance was encountered during the early morning of July 23rd near PARTINICO by CC"B". This was overcome by prompt flanking action. After first light on July 23rd, tanks were placed near the head of the advance guard which effectively reduced resistance at TERRACINI. Blown out roads, mines, road blocks, tank traps were encountered, slowing down their advance. At 1100B, the leading elements arrived at the Corps restraining line.

The division continued the occupation of the city to secure and maintain order.

July 24th - 25th - Guard and police of the city was turned over to the 3d Div, and the 2d Armid Div moved to bivouac NW of PALERMO.

#### 10. Summary -

a. The advance of the 2nd Armd Div from CAMFOBELLO to the final attack and capture of PALERMO divides itself into three natural phases as to type of movement.

(1) First, the displacement from CAMPOBELLO to AGRIGENTO, a distance of 37 miles, while army reserve. This march was made by bounds from one assembly area to the next by relatively small march units. No unit therefore had an opportunity for maintenance of its vehicles or equipment or for much rest for its personnel. The march was accomplished immediately after the beachhead phase of the operation where a considerable part of the division had been parceled out in small increments to infantry CT's in support of their operations. Each hour saw the division moving further and further away from its source of supply of special weight oils, gasoline, rations, 75mm gun ammunition and heavy maintenance that had been landed at GELA and LICATA. This was a serious problem particularly in view of the fact that administrative type vehicles in the form of 2-1/2 ton trucks had been cut down to less than a third of actual requirements in the interest of transporting the maximum of combat equipment for the initial landing and shuttling infantry forward.

(2) Second, the movement from AGRIGENTO to assembly in the vicinity of CASTELVETRANO and the BELICE RIVER preparatory to the actual envelopment. This distance was 54 miles and made across the rear of two divisions and on the same road with two Ranger Battalions and the 39th Combat Team. Defile after defile at which the enemy had effected demolitions was encountered, and which were passable with difficulty. Mines through this area had only been partially cleared. The advance along this road was very slow but still there was no opportunity to catch up on much needed maintenance and push forward supplies of oil that already were into the reserve carried by the organizations on combat vehicles.

(3) Third, the attack north from the BELICE RIVER to PALERMO, a distance of 60 miles covered in approximately 10 hours. During this advance the division encountered one defended road block or blown bridge after another. AT guns were invariably found disposed in depth, well sited and concealed and protected by infantry. Each of these positions had to be eliminated by fire and movement. The survivors of these defenses surrendered only after being hopelessly surrounded and cut off.

(4) As a result of this advance on arrival in PALERMO the tanks of the 2nd Armd Div were almost completely inoperative. The stock of gasoline had become dangerously low, rubber tracks that had been new on departing from Africa were worn down to the connectors and could last only a few more miles. b. It is important that all officers from company grade up receive

training in civil affairs of the country to be invaded. It was found that there were insufficient AMGOTs to handle this problem of civil government immediately behind armored division troops. That in the interim between the surrender of the towns and the arrival of AMGOTS, considerable must be done to establish good order and discipline and protect vivilians and their property against looting. It was found that this work must be done by commanders on the spot. c. PWI operators were found to be insufficiently trained for the

work required. In many cases it was found these operators were inclined to exaggerate information and due to lack of military background, fail to follow up leads that would have furnished valuable information.

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d. CIC operators must be carefully selected and highly trained in their work. Several officers attached to this division have done most excellent work in this line, however, cortain reports received from others have been so inaccurate that they did more harm than good.

e. Experience in two amphibious operations in which ship to shore loading was used, has shown the positive necessity for closer control over the operation of small craft. The LCT's, LCVP's and LCM's do not have the means of communication to permit their control after once launched and enroute to shore with their first loads. This control must head up through the command post afleat and the senior commander ashere through the beachmaster. The crews must be experienced, well trained, and have had considerable practice as a team.

f. Approximately 75% of the tracks of tanks were completely ruined on arrival at PALERMO. This rubber track block was of a new synthetic type material and although had traveled less than 300 miles was completely worn out. Steel tracks were generally speaking, in good condition.

g. Within an armored division, there is no provision for handling prisoners of war. Long sustained advances must be closely followed by line of communication troops to take over the guard and the processing of PW's and captured materiel. In many cases isolated groups of prisoners and materiel had to be left with insufficient guard a considerable distance behind the division.

h. In future operations of this nature, it is urgently recommended that MT ships carrying vehicles and combat equipment arrive in the transport area simultaneously with the troop ships carrying the crews, that arriving as they did on D plus 1, and after the crews of the vehicles had landed on the shore, there was created a difficult problem in joining crews with their vehicles.

i. The operation against PALERMO served to emphasize the tremendous supply problem involved in sustaining an armored division on the move and in action.

It is estimated that the organic vohicles within an armored division can keep the division supplied as long as the Army rail or truck head is within thirty (30) miles of the combat elements and a reasonable road net exists.

As this division landed with a very limited number of trucks due to shortage of shipping, it was able to maintain itself only by a close margin. All trucks hauled twenty-four (24) hours a day, being forced to draw from beach dumps. Due to the rapid movement of the division the distance from these dumps increased until it reached one hundred forty (140) miles.

Fortunately ammunition requirements for the operation were not heavy. Had the action been sustained and the domand for ammunition tonnage been heavy, it would have been impossible to have supplied the division with both gasoline and ammunition with the trucks available. The entire operation would have been seriously impeded and might have been entirely jeopardized.

For any operation of an armored division all classes of supplies must be pushed up within thirty (30) miles of the combat elements or if this is impossible at least three (3) additional supporting truck companies must be made available to augment the organic transportation.

GH J. GAFFEY.

Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding.



#### Inclosures :--

1 - Movement order for 2nd Armd Div to proceed to ALGERIA.

2 - Troop list Kool Force, 10 July 1943.

3 - Sketch, action at GEIA, 11 July 1943.

4 - Sketch, dispositions at GEIA, 12 July 1943.

5 - Sketch, disposition 13 July 1943.

6 - Sketch, disposition at BUTERA, 14-15 July 1943.

7 - Sketch, disposition, CC"B" 14-15 July 1943.

8 - Troop List, 2nd Armd Div, 18 July 1943.

9 - Sketch, operation 2nd Armd Div, 18-23 July 1943.

10 - consolidated Report, Battlo Casualties and Prisoners of War.

11 - consolidated Report on enemy captured material.



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22 April 1943

#### SUBJECT: Movement Orders.

TO.

#### : Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division.

1. Pursuant to radio directive CG Fifth Army, the 2nd Armored Division will move from present hocation to locations as indicated below.

a. One Combat Cormand to arrive Fifth Army Invasion Training Center on or about April 30th and be attached 3rd Infantry Division.

b. 55th Hodical Battalion to arrive AREEN vicinity May 5th and be relieved on arrival from 2nd Arnored Division and attached 3rd Infantry Division.

c. Remainder of 2nd Armored Division to arrive vicinity of SIDI BEL ABBES on or about May 8th.

2. Details for movement:

a. Ecvement by rail and motor. Full track and half track vehicles with necessary guard personnel by rail, remainder by motor.

b. Equipmont - full T/FA.

c. Five (5) days rations and basic load of armunition to be carricd.

d. Coordinate all movements with CG, ABS through highway and rail divisions.

e. Advance detachments will proceed to destinations without delay.

f. Motor clements pass to MBS control at GULRCIF.

g. Convoys will comply with AF Circular #20, c.s., and maintain radio silence and strict road discipline,

3. Convoy Commanders will be held strictly responsible that no firing of weepons of any type at tolephone wires. poles and installations, or other objects, occurs during the much by personnel of the convoy.

4. Agent Officers will clear their funds with the Finance Disbursing officer prior to movement.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 2 - CG. Fifth Army 1 - CG; ABS1 - CO, ABS, Rabat 1 - Hy Div; ABS, Casablanca 1 - Hy Div, ABS, Rabat 1 - Ry Div, ABS, Rabat 1 - CG 3d Div CCCI Lalic TRUE COPY E. A. TRAHAN Major, GOC,

/s/ R. E. CUMAINGS. /t/ R. E. CULLINGS Coloncl., AGD, Adjutant General.

NCC. Del MY



TROOP LIST - KOOL FORCE

Time of Landing - 10 July 1943

(1) Hq KOOL - Cmdg Maj Gon Hugh J Gaffey

142nd Signal Co (less dot)

(2) 18th RCT - Cmdg - Col G A Smith, 18th Inf

18th Inf (-)
32nd FA (-)
2 Flat's Co I, 67th AR
Co B, lst Engrs (-)
Co B, lst Mod Bn (-)
Co's A, B and C, 540th Engrs (-) (in support of landing only)
Det CIC
PWI Teams

(3) <u>CC "B" - Cmdg - Col I D White</u>

Hq CC "B" (-) plus det 142nd Sig Co 3rd Bn, 67th AR (-) Co A, 41st Armd Inf (-) 78th FA (less Sorv Btry and less dets Hq and firing Btry's) Co C, 82nd Ren (-) Co B, 17th Engrs (plus Dot Co E)

(4) Beach Group - Cmdg - Col G W Marvin

540th Engrs (less one Bn) 107th CA Bn (AA) (SP) (loss Btry's A, B and Dot's Hq Btry' Btry's D and C)

Dot 433rd CA Det 462nd Engr Co (Dop) Co D, 2637th Truck Bn Sect Co B, 205th QM Bn (GS) Plat 108th QM (RHD) Bn Team, 286th Sig Co (Amph) 603rd Ord Co (Amm) 3497th Ord Co (MM) (Q) (less det) Co B, 504th MP Bn Co A, 261st Mod Bn (Spec) Dot 401st Engr Bn (WS) Det 2658th Engr Co (Map Dep) "B" Clearing Platoon Co I), 51st Med Bn Plat Co A, 36th Amb Bn Det 3rd Aux Surg Grp (3 teams) Co A Naval Shoro Bn No. 4

(5) Reserve - Cmdg - Lt Col M J Morin, 41st Inf

lst Bn, 41st Inf (loss Co A and Sorv Det) (Dismounted) 82nd Rcn Bn (less Co's A, D and C and Det Hq Co)

Incl.#3 82g 0 COVER OF 12 UIV. DRIDGE HEAD AND ASSEMBLED AS SHOWLE. THE DIV. DRIDGE HEAD AND ASSEMBLED IST GERMAN TANKS SUPPORTED BY INFOF H.GDW. BROKE THRU IST DV. BRIDGE HEAD MORNING OF 11 JULY & ATTACKED TOWARD CC B BLUE UNDER 区 18cr (BEACH GROUP) DIV. BRIDGE HEAD AND ALCEN GERMANTANK ATTACK REPULSED DURING LATER MORNING BLAFTER: 4004 CRETCH SHOWING ACTION ן צ 世田 3ELA GELA, SICILY 11 JULY, 1343 NOKTH HPROX. DURING NIGHT KOOL FORCE aN COVER OF アビヨノヨ SCALE APPROX 1:100 COU LEGEND + 1 GELA



SKETCH SHOWING DISPOSITIONS TACKING ON WEST Z C 5 0 0 RANGERS ATTACHED TO 24 ARMD. UN 1819 CT. REVERTED TO 14 DIV. SECOND. ARMD. UN. PROTECTEU SECOND ARMO. DIVISION NE PATROLLING ZE ARM'D DIX ELEMENTS 13 טנירי, 1943 LEGEND DEATNIATED m Z 2 Per 02 .iga WITH RANGERS & HUB ショー DEMOLITION & HHN FL ANKS EAST incl. #5 图4 NOETH 書 ButerA 176







Nº5 SKETCH SHOWING DISPOSITIONS COMBAT COMMAND'B' 14-15 JULT 1943

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TROLOSURE NO 8 TROP 1151 HQ 200 ARMD DIV 10 JULY 1943

HQ 2ND ARMORED DIVISION 142nd Sig Co (less Det's) Btry B, 106th CA (AA) Bn

HQ COMBAT COMMAND "A"

Det 142nd Sig Co 66th Armd Regt (-C Co) 41st Inf Regt (- 1st Bn<sup>3</sup>) Co A, 17th Engr Dr (det Co E atchd) Co A, 48th Med Bn 14th FA Bn Btry D, 106th CA (AA) Bn

#### H& COMBAT COMMAND "B"

3rd Bn; 67th Armd Regt (plus 2 Plats Co E) 1st Bn, 41st Inf Regt Co B; 17th Engr Bn Co C, 66th Armd Regt

#### DIVISION CONTROL

lst Ranger Bn
4th Ranger Bn
78th FA Bn (Etry C, 106th CA atchd) (less Serv Btry & Dets Hq
firing Btry's)
Bn Hq 106th CA (AA) Bn

#### DIVISION TRAINS

Co A & Det Co B, Sup Bn Det's Co's A & B, Maint Bn Clearing Plat Co D, 51st Med Bn Plat Co A, 36th Ambulance Bn Btry A, 106th CA Det Co C, 48th Med Bn Det 48th CM (GRS)

82nd Rcn Bn (less Co A) attached to Prov Corps.



### BATTLE CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR

### CONSOLIDATED REPORT

	KILLED	MISSING	CAPTURED BY ENEMY		WOUNDED NOT EVAC	PRISONE CO OF WAR
Kool Force 10 - 17 July	24	8	0	58	24 ·	2746
CC"A" Force 10 - 17 July	25	20	5	132	<b>22</b>	3907
2d Armd Div 18 - 25 July	7	4	0	10	4	9546
TOTAL	56	32	5	200	50	16199

INCL. Nº10

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MEADQUARTERS 2D ANMORED DIVISION Office of the Division Commander

> COMSOLIDÀTED PEPORT OF CAPTURED EMINY MATERIAL

- 1. KOOL FORCE from July 10 to July 17 1945.
  - a. Vchicles.

Truck, "Fiat" Command Car "Spa" Truck, 3/4-Ton "Afla" Truck, 25-Ton "Bianchi" Truck, 1/2-Ton Cargo "Spa" Truck, 2-Ton Cargo "Fiat" Trailer, 1-Ton, German		1 7 3 4 1 1
b. Weapons. Hovitzer, 100/17 Gun, Machine, (Light) Rifle, Automatic, 9mm Lines, Teller 2	91 9 9	1 3 3 400

2. Combat Command "A" from 10 July 1943 to 17 July 1943.

a. Vehicles

Truck, 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> -Ton Bianchi <sup>n</sup>		
Motorcycle, solo		
Trailer, water, 350-gal	i	
Truck, prime mover		
• -		

b. Weapons.

88mm Gun 75mm Gun

c. Fuel and Lubricants.

Gasoline, low octane

20,000 gals.

1 7 3

4

8

3. Second Armored Division - 18 July 1943 to 25 July 1943.

a. Vehicles.

Truck, "Fiat"	1
Command Car,	
Truck, 3-Ton	"Alfa"



HEADQUAR FERS 2D ARMORED DIVISION Office of the Division Commender

> CONSOLIDATED PEPORT OF CAPTURED ENLINY MATERIAL .

1. KOOL FORCE from July 10 to July 17 1943.

#### a. Vehicles.

Truck, "Fiat"	ĺ.
Command Car "Spa"	7
Truck, 3/4-Ton "Afla"	3
Truck, 22-Ton "Bianchi"	4
Truck 1/2-Ton Cargo "Spa"	1
Truck 2- Ton Cargo "Fiat"	1
Trailer, 1-Ton, German	1
h Macagan	
b. Weapons. Hovitzer, 100/17	ı
Gun, Hachine, (Light)	3
Rifle, Automatic, 9mm	3
KLITE, AUOULACTE, Jun	· 400
mines, Teller "2	100

hine	es,Telle	r "2				- 4(	00				
Combat	Command	"À"	from	10	July	1943	to	17	July	1943.	•
a. <u>Veh</u>	icles	. ~							,	,	
Tru	ok, 2 <sup>1</sup> -Tor	n Bia	n chi	11		4	40				
Mot	orcycle,	sol	D	_			10				

Ъ.	Weap	ons.	

2.

88mm Gun 75mm Gun

c. Fuel and Lubricants.

Trailer, water, 350-gal

Truck, prime mover

Gasoline, low octane 20,000 gals.

3. Second Armored Division - 18 July 1943 to 25 July 1943.

1 5

4

8

a. Vehicles.

Truck, "Fiat"	1 - Carlos	•	1
Command Car,		<b>*</b>	7
Truck, 3-Ton		• •	3



184

### 6. Other Military Supplies:

There is a considerable amount of Engineer Supplies, estimated around thirty tons. Large quantities of military stores are now in process of collection and more has yot to be located.



MEADQUAR FERS 2D ANNORED DIVISION Office of the Division Commander

COMSOLIDATED PEPORT

 $O^{T^{n}}$ 

CAPTURED DELINY MATLERIAL

- 1. KOOL FORCE from July 10 to July 17 1943.
  - a. Vehicles.

Truck, "Fiat" Command Car "Spa" Truck, 3/4-Ton "Afla" Truck,2:-Ton "Bianchi" Truck, 1/2-Ton Cargo "Spa" Truck,2-Ton Cargo "Fiat" Trailer, 1-Ton, German	1 7 3 4 1 1
b. Weapons. Howitzer, 100/17	1

Howitzer, 100/17		1
Gun, Machine, (Light)		3
Rifle, Automatic, 9mm	-	3
nines, Teller 1/2 .	1	400

2. Combat Command "A" from 10 July 1943 to 17 July 1943.

a. Vehicles

Truck, 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> -Ton Bianchi"	40
Motorcycle, solo	10
Trailer, water, 350-gal	ī
Truck, prime mover	5

b. Weapons.

88mm Gun 75mm Gun

c. Fuel and Lubricants.

Gasoline, low octane

20,000 gals.

4

8

1 7 3

18.

3. Second Armored Division - 18 July 1943 to 25 July 1943.

a. Vehicles.

Truch, "Fiat" Command Car, "Spa" Truck, 3-Ton "Alfa"



#### a. Vehicles (Continued)

Truck, 3/4-Ton "Spa" Truck, 22-Ton "Bianchi" Truck, 12-Ton Cargo "Spa" Lorrie, Italian Bantam, 4-Passenger Tricycle (motored) Motorcycle, w/sidecar Trailer, 1/2-Ton Car, Reconnaissance Ambulance Tractor

4

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186

11

b. Weapons

(1) Artillery

149mm Gun 90/53ma Gun 88mm Gun 152mm Gun (coastal) 120mm Gun 105mm Gun 152mm Gun 75mm Howitzer 47mm Gun 75mm Gun 20mm Gun (A..) 172mm Gun 76/40mm Gun 100/17mm Gun

c. Small arms.

As of 25 July 1943, there has been captured some forty two tone small arms of all types; this includes light and heavy machine guns, automatic rifles, rifles, carbines and pistols. There still remains however, a considerable quantity of small arms now in the process of collection, segregation, and evacuation.

4. Amunition.

So for, fifteen ammunition dumps, totaling some 7500 tons of all types of ammunition have been captured. Over 5,000 mines (Teller) have been found. There are numerous small arms dumps of which no count is available.

5. Fuel and Lubricants:

a. Gasoline: Estimated 650,000 gallons of low octane gasoline

b. Oil: Estimated 130,000 gallons of 30 weight oil.



## 6. Other Military Supplies:

There is a considerable amount of Engineer Supplies, estimated around thirty tons. Large quantities of military stores are now in process of collection and more has yet to be located.